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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
MORTGAGES-FoRECLOSURE-EFFECT ON JUNIOR LIENS-RE-
PURCHASE BY MORTGAGOR.-Defendant purchased real property from
the plaintiff and agreed to assume a first mortgage held by the Title
Guarantee & Trust Co. Defendant also gave to plaintiff a purchase
money mortgage which the parties expressly agreed should be a junior
and subordinate lien to the first mortgage. The holder of the first
mortgage bid the property in on foreclosure sale and four months
thereafter sold it to the children of the defendant. This action is
brought to foreclose the second mortgage on the theory that the de-
fendant fraudulently conspired to effect a foreclosure of the first mort-
gage and that the present owners were dummies acting for him, and
by reason thereof plaintiff's lien should become revested. Special
Term found that the whole transaction was tainted with fraud and
upheld plaintiff's contention. Upon an appeal from an affirmance by
the Appellate Division, held, reversed. Inasmuch as the income from
the property was insufficient to meet the fixed charges, and no affir-
mative proof of fraud was shown, the finding of fraud and collusion
was against the weight of evidence. Dorff v. Bornstein, 277 N. Y.
236, 14 N. E. (2d) 51 (1938).
The modern doctrine ' is that the mortgagee has no estate in or
title to the land; nor has he the right of possession either before or
after the mortgage becomes due. 2 He only acquires such title by pur-
chase at the foreclosure sale.3 The effect of the foreclosure deed is to
cut off the mortgagor's equity of redemption 4 and to vest in the pur-
chaser the entire interest and estate of the mortgagor as it existed at
the date of the mortgage, unaffected by subsequent encumbrances and
conveyances of the mortgagor.5 The foreclosure being perfect, a new
estate in the new owner is created and the rights of subsquent mort-
gagees are finally and forever extinguished.6 The purchaser ordi-
narily having absolute title may do with the land whatever he deems
proper and may even convey it to the original owner without thereby
'The modern lien theory, applied in New York, is that the mortgagee has
a mere lien on the property, or right to have the specific property sold and the
proceeds applied to the payment of the debt. Under strict common law rule,
still applied in many states, the mortgage was deemed a conveyance and the
mortgagor merely retained an equity of redemption. 1 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th
ed. 1928) § 12.
'Ten Eyck v. Craig, 62 N. Y. 406 (1875).IN. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1085: "A conveyance upon a sale made pursuant
to final judgment in an action to foreclose a mortgage upon real property vests
in the purchaser the same estate only that would have vested in the mortgagee
if the equity of redemption had been foreclosed." (The statute refers to the
strict common law theory. See note 1, supra.)
'Lansing v. Goelet, 9 Cow. 345 (N. Y. 1827).
53 JONES, op. cit. supra note 1,- §§ 2121, 2122, 1653, 1654; Chicago & Vin-
cennes R. R. v. Fosdick, 106 U. S. 47 (1882) ; Rector v. Mack, 93 N. Y. 488(1883) ; Sautter v. Frick, 229 App. Div. 345, 242 N. Y. Supp. 369 (4th Dept.
1930), aff'd, 256 N. Y. 535, 177 N. E. 129 (1931).
'Instant case at 241; Hopkins v. Wolley, 81 N. Y. 77 (1880); Plum v.
Studebaker Co., 89 Mo. 162, 1 S. W. 217 (1886); Huzzey v. Heffernan, 143
Mass. 232, 9 N. E. 570 (1887).
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revesting the subordinate liens.7 If, however, there is collusion be-
tween the original owner and the first mortgagee or if the transaction
is tainted with fraud then said owner on repurchase would not take
the property free from the subordinate liens.8 Again the original
owner might be estopped from denying the revesting of subordinate
liens where the mortgagor inserts unconditional covenants of warranty
against incumbrances without expressly excepting the first mortgage; 9
or where he has some duty 10 and fraudulently acts to cut off the in-
terest of the mortgagee by omitting to meet the obligation. Upon re-
purchase under such circumstances the original owner becomes seized
in trust 11 for the subordinate mortgagee.
The New York rule seems to be clearly settled that in the absence
of fraud, and of any contract duty or trust towards the junior lienors,
a mortgagor may repurchase property from a bona fide purchaser
and thereby acquire a perfect title. It would seem that the benefit
resulting to the mortgagor in such case would be merely incidental
to the desire to protect the bona fide purchaser in his disposition of
the property. The latter buys at the foreclosure sale with the under-
standing that he is going to be able to give a clear title to anyone to
whom he sells. Naturally his market is limited if he cannot convey
such a title to the mortgagor, who, if he is financially able, would
probably be a prospective buyer. Where, however, the original mort-
gagor bids in the property, the reason for the rule would not exist,
and in such case it would appear that the repurchase would inure to
the benefit of the junior lienors.12
In some states the junior mortgagee may rest his claim upon
statutory provisions. A Mississippi court basing its decision on stat-
utes 13 held that the reacquired title of the mortgagor inures to the
IInstant case at 242; Plum v. Studebaker Co., 89 Mo. 162, 1 S. W. 217(1886), cited sapra note 6; Federal Farm Mortgage Corp. v. Larson et al.,
- Wis. -, 278 N. W. 421 (1938).
' Mendenhall v. Hall, 134 U. S. 559, 10 Sup. Ct. 616 (1890); Stiger v.
Mahone, 24 N. J. Eq. 426 (1874); Tompson v. Heywood, 129 Mass. 401
(1880).
If the income from the mortgaged premises is not sufficient, the mortgagor
is not acting fraudulently by omitting to use personal funds to keep the first
mortgage from default. Instant case at 240.
'Parsons v. Little, 66 N. H. 339, 20 At1. 958 (1890) ; Baird v. Chamberlain,
60 N. D. 784, 236 N. W. 724 (1931). Accord: Ayer v. Philadelphia and
Boston Face Brick Co., 157 Mass. 57, 31 N. E. 717 (1892) (a statement in
the granting clause to the effect that there is a prior mortgage will not save
the mortgagor from being estopped when he reacquires title).
"Oliphant v. Burns, 146 N. Y. 218, 40 N. E. 980 (1895) ; Pines v. Novick,
168 App. Div. 155, 153 N. Y. Supp. 891 (2d Dept. 1915) (where mortgagor
had to pay taxes and assessments and keep the mortgaged premises free from
the paramount governmental lien).
U National Surety Co. v. Walker, 148 Iowa 157, 125 N. W. 338 (1910);
Wheeler v. Hardy, 123 Misc. 775, 206 N. Y. Supp. 148 (1924) ; 3 JoNEs, op.
cit. mipra note 5, § 841.
"3 JONES, Op. cd. mipra note 5, § 2429.
'Miss. CoDE ANN. (1930) §§ 2124, 2125; applied in Martin v. Raleigh,
19381
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benefit of the second mortgagee. California 14 and North Dakota 15
have enacted similar legislation.
J. Z.
MORTGAGES-REAL-PERSONAL - "AFTER-AcQUIRED" CLAUSE.
-The plaintiff is the holder by mesne assignments of a first mort-
gage. The defendant is the purchaser of the furnishings of the hotel
which were sold under a chattel mortgage when the owner went into
bankruptcy. The plaintiff instituted proceedings to foreclose the
realty mortgage and claimed that the furniture, furnishings, kitchen
equipment and other contents of the building were subject to the mort-
gage by virtue of a clause contained therein which, after describing
the real property in detail, contained the following clause of coverage:
"together with all fixtures and articles of personal property, now or
hereafter attached to, or used in connection with the premises, all of
which are covered by this mortgage." 1 The building loan mortgage
provided that the loan should be advanced from time to time as the
building progressed. When the final payment was made there was
an outstanding conditional sales contract on file embracing furniture.
Subsequently, a chattel mortgage upon the furnishings and movables
was executed and delivered by the owner. On appeal from a judg-
ment for plaintiff, held, reversed. The facts and circumstances with
respect to the personal property in controversy do not justify a con-
clusion that it was included within the terms of the mortgage. Manu-
facturers Trust Company v. Peck-Schwartz Realty Corporation, et al.,
277 N. Y. 283, 14 N. E. (2d) 70 (1938).
The movables in the instant case would come within the terms
of the coverage clause: (1) if they became fixtures 2 as a matter of
146 Miss. 1, 111 So. 448 (1927) (the mortgagor repurchased foreclosed prop-
erty from the grantee of buyer at foreclosure sale).
" CAL. CIv. CODE (Deering, 1937) § 2930.
'N. D. ComP. LAWS (1913-25) §6731. Both California (see note 14,
supra) and North Dakota have enacted that "title acquired by the mortgagor
subsequent to the execution of the mortgage inures to the mortgagee as security
for the debt in like manner as if acquired before the execution." It has been
interpreted to apply to cases where the mortgagor had title, lost it, and sub-
sequently reacquired title, as much as to cases where the mortgagor not having
title at first acquired it subsequent to the mortgage. Jensen v. Duke, 71 Cal.
App. 210, 234 Pac. 876 (1925) ; Merchants National Bank of Fargo v. Miller,
59 N. D. 273, 229 N. W. 357 (1930).
1 This is the same clause as the one read into a mortgage by statute except
that the words "now or hereafter" and "all of which are covered by this mort-
gage" are not included in the statutory form. N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 254,
subd. 1, Cons. Laws, c. 50.
'Ford v. Cobb, 20 N. Y. 344 (1859). A fixture is a thing permanent in its
nature which has lost the character of personal property and has become a part
of a definite parcel of land by permanent annexation. Whether the thing has
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